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A B S T R A C T
In the last two decades, attention on forests and ownership rights has increased in different domains of inter-
national policy, particularly in relation to achieving the global sustainable development goals. This paper looks
at the changes in forest-specific legislation applicable to regular productive forests, across 28 European
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countries. We compare the legal framework applicable in the mid-1990s with that applicable in 2015, using the
Property Rights Index in Forestry (PRIF) to measure changes across time and space. The paper shows that forest
owners in most western European countries already had high decision-making power in the mid-1990s, fol-
lowing deregulation trends from the 1980s; and for the next two decades, distribution of rights remained largely
stable. For these countries, the content and direction of changes indicate that the main pressure on forest-focused
legislation comes from environmental discourses (e.g. biodiversity and climate change policies). In contrast,
former socialist countries in the mid-1990s gave lower decision-making powers to forest owners than in any of
the Western Europe countries; over the next 20 years these show remarkable changes in management, exclusion
and withdrawal rights. As a result of these changes, there is no longer a clear line between western and former
socialist countries with respect to the national governance systems used to address private forest ownership.
Nevertheless, with the exception of Baltic countries which have moved towards the western forest governance
system, most of the former socialist countries still maintain a state-centred approach in private forest man-
agement. Overall, most of the changes we identified in the last two decades across Europe were recorded in the
categories of management rights and exclusion rights. These changes reflect the general trend in European forest
policies to expand and reinforce the landowners’ individual rights, while preserving minimal rights for other
categories of forest users; and to promote the use of financial instruments when targeting policy goals related to
the environmental discourse.
1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the emerging political agendas of bio-
diversity conservation, climate change and bio-economy has increased
political attention on sustainable forest management (Winkel, 2017).
During the same period, European forest policy was challenged by
forest ownership changes, which are the result of the changes in life-
style, attitudes and behaviours of forest owners, the forest land resti-
tution in Eastern Europe, the support for afforestation, and the in-
cidence of new forms of ownership (Weiss et al., 2019a). As a result, a
complex system of political, social and scientific interactions from in-
side and outside of the forest sector is increasingly influencing forest
policies (Klapwijk et al., 2018). This is reflected in country specific
governance frameworks, with different combinations of mandatory or
voluntary, public or private policy instruments (Nichiforel and Hujala,
2019; Pülzl et al., 2013).
Considering that more than 60% of European forests are privately
owned (UNECE/FAO, 2019), property rights arrangements are critical
institutions defining the relations between the private forest owners
(PFO), forest managers, resource users and forest authorities (Siry et al.,
2015). Property rights refer to particular actions authorised by specific
operational rules (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). The “de jure” property
rights are guaranteed and implemented by the state. They are reflected
in national or regional regulatory frameworks defining what a forest
owner may or may not do in relation to her/his forest. While some
property rights are defined directly in the text of laws, some other
„operational rules” with impact on the exercise of the property rights
are defined at the level of different other regulative acts, such as Min-
isterial resolutions or administrative decisions/guidelines. In the Eur-
opean context, the forest-focused regulations impacting on the de jure
distribution of PFOs rights include forest codes, forest acts, forest-re-
lated acts, technical prescriptions, and operational guidelines (Pülzl
et al., 2013).
Even though the form of forest ownership (Schmithüsen and Hirsch,
2010) and the relevance of property rights in forest management
(Glück, 2002) are given high importance in the literature, there is little
analytically derived empirical knowledge on the differences in property
rights across countries and how these differences evolved over time
(Weiss et al., 2019b). To address this issue, Nichiforel et al. (2018)
developed the Property Rights Index in Forestry (PRIF) as an analytical
tool to measure property rights distribution among private forest
owners across Europe. The PRIF provides a structured overview of the
power of decision-making that forest owners have across a variety of
national or regional legal contexts. The PRIF index makes possible the
characterisation of “de jure” property rights, in a specific jurisdiction at
a certain point in time (Nichiforel et al., 2018). This paper adds to this
emerging research agenda by documenting and analysing the trends of
change in the PRIF across Europe. This is achieved by comparing the
legal provisions that applied in the mid-1990s with those that applied in
the year 2015. This allows the systematic identification of the property
rights changes in a time frame of two decades and provides a sound
method to highlight and discuss the geographical patterns of changes.
The design of the institutional framework that governs the forest
production system is subject to changes and influences by stakeholders.
The actors in the forest production system are guided by the “rules of
the game” (North, 1990), which are created in time and space by the
interaction between “rule makers” and “rule takers” (Möllering, 2007).
This means that the actors of the system can expend different efforts in
order to modify or preserve the structure of the property rights ac-
cording to their interest (Nichiforel and Schanz, 2011). This is reflected
in examples such as lobbying policy makers and legislators by PFOs in
some former socialist countries with a view to increasing their man-
agement and withdrawal rights (Bouriaud et al., 2013) or the political
efforts made by PFOs in some western countries to defend the current
structure of rights against demands for forest conservation (McCauley,
2008). Thus, property rights arrangements are created, maintained or
redistributed as an outcome of the interactions between stakeholders
who resist or propose changes that benefit themselves, as well as law
makers, who receive political benefits from making rules (Ostrom and
Hess, 2008; Sikor et al., 2017). The property rights allocation pertaining
to forest ownership is therefore part of a continuous socio-political
negotiation process, involving the PFOs and other stakeholders under
the specific authority structure of the state (Vatn, 2001).
The diversity of pressures and challenges faced by the forest sector
may require institutional adaptation in order to direct PFOs' manage-
ment towards desired policy outcomes. However, stable property rights
are an important prerequisite for enhancing entrepreneurship in the
forest sector (Bouriaud et al., 2011), to increase the adaptive capacity
required to respond to natural disturbances (Coleman, 2011) and to
implement successful payment schemes designed to promote forest
conservation (Larson et al., 2013). Thus, there is a dilemma of gov-
ernance with respect to the role of the state in assigning property rights.
On one hand, the state can use its authority to assure the stability of the
property rights system and thus maintain a firm institutional environ-
ment. On the other hand, the state can also exercise its authority to
revise the content of the property rights so as to comply with interna-
tional norms, initiatives and agreements or to create opportunities to
enhance the social welfare and resolve social conflicts.
For example, in Western European countries, changes seem to
comprise at least two opposing trends. First, the de-regulatory discourse
during the 1980s challenged the efficiency of the existing top-down
regulation system and resulted in a liberalisation trend in forest legis-
lation promoting self-regulation and voluntary policy instruments (Arts
et al., 2010; Pülzl et al., 2014). Since the early 1990s, this led to an
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increased role of Corporate Social Responsibility in the forest sector
(Toppinen et al., 2012) and of various voluntary certification systems,
standards, and guidelines operating at different points across the supply
chain to address the sustainability of biomass utilization (Stupak et al.,
2011). Second, the implementation of environmental/nature con-
servation legislation such as the European Natura 2000 policy resulted
in increasing restrictions (Sotirov et al., 2017; Weiss et al., 2019a)
which have been frequently questioned by PFO associations who op-
posed the changes in property rights (Alphandéry and Fortier, 2001;
Primmer et al., 2014). At the same time, following the fall of the so-
cialist bloc during the 1990s, significant changes to forest legislation
were made in the former socialist European countries (Weiland, 2010).
Developments in those countries, however, are not homogeneous
(Bouriaud and Schmithüsen, 2005). For example, this is illustrated by
the difference in the manner in which the process of forest restitution in
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was carried out despite
their common background: i.e. the two states that for a long time
formed a single state (Jarský et al., 2018). The changes in the forest
ownership structure in former socialist countries were associated with
different patterns of changes in regulation of private forest management
(Bouriaud et al., 2013).
In general, the changes in the European legal framework in forest
sector have been studied by the research community (e.g. Winkel and
Sotirov, 2016). However, the use of PRIF for comparative legal as-
sessments provides a homogenous and unitary methodology for the
quantitative analysis of legal changes. By comparing the PRIF and its
components at two points in time we are able to identify how the
changes in the forest-specific legislation influenced the distribution of
the property rights, and which are the spatio-temporal differences
among European jurisdictions.
The next section introduces the methods used for the calculation of
the PRIF at two points in time. In the results section, we first give an
overview on the relevant legislative changes (covering the period
1990–2015), followed by the analysis of their impact on the property
rights (comparing the changes of the PRIF between mid-1990s and
2015). Finally, the results are discussed and the concluding section
highlights the key points of this assessment.
2. Methods
The cross-country analysis of the identification of property rights
changes uses the PRIF methodology as presented in Nichiforel et al.
(2018). The PRIF is based on 37 indicators (Table A1-appendix A)
grouped into five property rights categories associated with forest
production: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). The indicators were designed to assess
the rigour of the legal framework and the scope for freedom of decision-
making attributed to forest owners. Thus, the indicators are assessed
based on the rule of law (de jure situation) and do not consider per-
ceptions regarding their practical implementation (de facto situation).
The study was conducted by use of a questionnaire sent to national
experts in forest policy who had participated in the COST Action FP
1201 FACESMAP or were selected based on their scientific contribution
in the field of forest policy analysis. Data collection took place in
2015–2017 and consisted of two main parts.
Firstly, the national experts were asked to document the legislative
changes in the period between 1990 and 2015. The calculation of PRIF
and the identification of property rights changes focuses on “regular
productive forests”. Thus, legal provisions referring to forests in pro-
tected areas (e.g. Natura 2000 sites) or forests that are subject to plant
health or quarantine measures, are not included in the analysis. All of
the other forest-relevant legislative policy areas that can impact a PFOs'
scope of decision making were considered. After an initial exploration
of policy tools affecting the five property rights categories, three types
of legal acts emerged: 1. Forest laws (sometimes named Forest Codes,
Forest Acts), 2. Hunting laws and 3. Land use laws (Fig. 1). We
documented the changes that affect forest owners which occurred to
these legal acts in the period 1990–2015 for each country. The legal
changes were classified either as major changes (a law revision re-
presenting a change that affected the constitutional level of rules) or as
minor changes (an amendment to the law affecting mostly the opera-
tional-level of rules). The sequence of these changes provided the legal
background that is used to assess the indicators which are in turn used
to identify the changes to property rights.
Secondly, the questionnaire asked for an expert assessment of the 37
indicators based on the rules of law applicable to private forests at two
distinct points in time:
- The “mid-1990s legislation” refers to the legislation applicable in
the period 1993–1999, which was chosen as a reference, because the
former socialist countries in Europe underwent important institu-
tional changes during this time. Almost all of the countries included
in the analysis have as a reference point the end of 1999, with the
exception of Slovenia (reference year 1993), Czech Republic (re-
ference year 1996), Poland (reference year 1997) and Estonia (re-
ference year 1998).
- The “current legislation” refers to the status of applicable legislation
on the 1st of October 2015, as detailed in the data collection pro-
tocol.
The assessment of the indicators was based on the qualitative
questionnaire that was distributed to the experts, with each question
representing an individual indicator. The role of the national experts
was to identify the legal provisions applicable for each indicator in their
jurisdiction, for each of the two points in time. Three situations were
identified in relation to changes to the laws and the changes to PRIF
indicators:
- the changes to the legal acts resulted in changes to the indicators; in
this case, a description and interpretation of the situation in both
timeframes was provided to gauge the alterations to the restrictions
imposed on PFO.
- an indicator had more than one change in the time frame from mid-
1990s to 2015; in such cases all the changes are discussed, but only
the legal provisions corresponding to the two points in time are used
for the PRIF calculation.
- the changes in the legal acts did not result in changes to the in-
dicators; thus, the legal changes did not impact on PRIF calculation.
The methodological foundation of PRIF (Nichiforel et al., 2018)
presents the steps used for data processing, data weighting and the
aggregation of indicators in the calculation of PRIF (Appendix A2).
According to the PRIF methodology, each indicator contained a set of
predefined alternatives (i.e. the alternatives identified for each in-
dicator based on the legal stipulations found across the analysed jur-
isdictions). The identification of the predefined alternatives was carried
out on the basis of the legal texts in the “current” 2015 legislation. This
set of alternatives proved to be applicable also for the “mid 1990s
legislation”, which allowed the calculation of PRIF, in the two time
frames, using the same initial methodology. The alternatives were
sorted out and weighted, in a double blind expert based process, to
quantify the degree of freedom in decision making. The scale for as-
sessing the rigour of the law for the alternatives identified for each
indicator ranged from 0 – meaning “the right is fully restricted” to 100
meaning “no legal restrictions are imposed”, with intermediary values
being possible. The scale is designed so as to approach the property
rights from the perspective of PFOs. Thus, a change to an indicator that
brings more restrictions to PFO freedoms results in a decrease in the
value assigned for that indicator.
All indicators were considered to be equally weighted in the index
to allow for comparisons between jurisdictions with different forest
policy and regulatory landscapes. Thus, the PRIF is calculated as the
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Fig. 1. Timeline evolution of changes occurring in the forest-related legal acts. Enactment year of a new Forest Act/Forest Code is identified with „F“(dark orange),
for a new Hunting Law with „H“(dark blue) and for a new Land Use Act with „L“(intense yellow). Amendments to these laws, that represent changes to the content of
the law, are identified with equivalent small letter: „f“(soft orange), “h“(light blue) and „l“(light yellow)“. The numbers before the letters represent the quantification
of the number of changes in a specific year and for the total per country and groups of countries. (Source: compiled by the authors). (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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mean of the values for each indicator for the set of 37 indicators. The
value of the index can range from 0 – when full restrictions apply for all
the indicators to 100 – when owners have a full degree of freedom for
all the indicators. For example, the assessment of the legislation ap-
plicable in 2015 resulted in PRIF ranging from 38.4 in North Macedonia
to 84.7 in the Netherlands, implying considerably greater freedom for
the forest owner in the Netherlands (Nichiforel et al., 2018).
We have analysed the property rights changes on a European scale
comparison based on the data provided by 28 countries (abbreviations
of the jurisdictions are identified using the ISO 3166). In five countries
the legal framework was analysed considering the jurisdiction at the
regional level: Wallonia – Belgium (BE-WAL), Bavaria – Germany (DE-
BY), Aargau – Switzerland (CH-AG), Scotland – United Kingdom (GB-
SCT) and Catalonia – Spain (ES-CAT). For Austria, the hunting legis-
lation was analysed at the level of Styria. In terms of geographical
distribution, the countries analysed cover all the regions identified by
the Forest Europe (2015) group of countries (Fig. 1): North-Europe
(NE), Central-West Europe (CWE), Central-East Europe (CEE), South
West Europe (SWE) and South East Europe (SEE). Among the countries
analysed, 13 of them have a former socialist political background while
15 are categorised as having a “western” political background. In the
display of the results, the North-Europe is divided between “western
societies” Nordic countries (NWE) and former socialist societies in the
Baltic states (NEE).
3. Forest relevant legislative changes
3.1. Changes to forest-related legislation
In a timeframe of 26 years (1990–2015), the legal acts regulating
forest management were adapted in the majority of the countries ana-
lysed (Fig. 1). In the decade 1990–1999, 16 new forest acts entered into
force, 11 of which were issued in former socialist countries. The years
where most of changes occurred in this decade are 1993 (four new acts)
and 1996 (three new acts). In the next decade (2000–2009) 12 new
forest acts entered into force out of which seven in former socialist
countries and five in western countries. The last six years of the analysis
included four new acts, all of them elaborated in former socialist
countries.
We generally can distinguish between three patterns:
i) countries who kept to a minimum the number of changes to forest-
related legislation and thus no new forest act was legally endorsed
in the period analysed: Austria (AT), France (FR), Greece (GR),
Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Netherlands (NL) and the United
Kingdom (GB);
ii) countries that legislated only one new forest act in the time span
analysed: Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZ), Finland (FI), Norway
(NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Spain
(ES), Switzerland (CH) and Sweden (SE);
iii) countries that legislated at least two new forest acts between 1990
and 2015: Bosnia-Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR),
Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), North
Macedonia (MK), Romania (RO) and Serbia (RS).
The first group of countries, characterised by limited changes in the
forest-related legislation, are mainly from CWE. In the Netherlands, the
Forestry Act (originating from 1961) has not changed for decades and
in the period analysed only minor administrative changes occurred. A
similar situation is found in the UK (Scotland) were no amendments
affecting property rights have been made to the Forest Act. In Ireland,
several minor amendments were made to the 1946 Forestry Act, which
were not really of concern to PFOs, except a change from 2001 invol-
ving indicators regarding forest lands selling and what price the owner
can get. In Austria, despite the fact that the Forest Act (originating from
1975) was amended 13 times, only the 2002 amendment had an impact
on PFOs property rights. For German Federal Law (originating from
1975) and Bavarian Forest Law (originating from 1974) only in 2005
did some provisions of Germany's nature protection regulations have an
impact on the PRIF. In France, there was a significant revision to the
French forest code (originating from 1827) in 2001 (introduction of the
notion of multi-functionality), but no real impact to PFO's rights oc-
curred. In 2010 alone, an important amendment was added to the forest
code that influenced the matter of requirements for forest management
plans (FMP). Additional to the CWE group of countries, in Greece two
legal acts from 2014 amended the Forestry Law from 1979, validating
and supplementing a series of scattered legislative provisions in respect
of the definition of forests and utilization of forest lands.
In the second group of countries, that legislated one new forest act
in the timeframe analysed, both the geographical distribution and the
former socio-political background is diverse. In Portugal, the Forest
Code from 1996 defined the basis for the national forest policy. A legal
change with impact in PRIF occurred in 2009 with a Law-decree which
approved forest management and forest intervention plans foreseen in
the Forest Code of 1996. In Spain, the autonomous communities re-
ceived the right to rule on natural resource management during the
1980s (including forests and hunting). The Spanish Forest Act of 2003
put in place a common framework for all regional laws. Catalonia in-
troduced pioneering forest legislation in 1988, and the subsequent new
Spanish Forest Act (2003) and its amendments (2006, 2015) which
apply to whole of Spain were already implemented in Catalonia.
Consequently, while the forest law formally changed in Spain, it had no
impact in changing PFOs property rights in Catalonia though it had in
other Spanish regions. In Switzerland, a Federal Act on Forests entered
into force in 1993 setting out the principles to be implemented by
cantonal forest legislation. For the Aargau canton, a new Forest Law
entered into force in 1999 and was amended in 2013 but the changes
had no impact on the indicators used for this assessment. In Belgium,
the Forest Code (originating from 1854), has been replaced in 2008
with a new Forest Code applicable in the Walloon region. Additionally,
a specific law regarding the protection of forests belonging to PFOs has
been in force in Belgium since 2008, impacting on the management
rights of PFOs.
Among the Nordic countries, the Norwegian Forest Act (originally
enacted in 1932) was replaced in 2005 with a new Forestry Act but kept
the similar level of PFOs rights. On the contrary, in the analysed period
Sweden and Finland had important changes with respect to the legal
acts regulating the activity of PFOs. In Sweden, a major change oc-
curred in 1993, with the introduction of the “freedom with responsi-
bility” principle in the text of the Forest Act but since then, the
amendments made to the law had no impact on PFOs rights. In 1996,
Finland introduced a major update to the Forest Act, by introducing
biodiversity protection explicitly in regulatory statutes. However, a
noteworthy change took place in 2014 when a major update to the
forest legislation bestowed more freedom upon forest owners with re-
lation to decision making in forest management.
Poland (1991), Slovenia (1993), Czech Republic (1996) and
Slovakia (2005) are the former socialist countries that legislated for
only one new forest law designed to cope with the new challenges of the
transition from a centrally-planed to a market economy. In Poland, no
change occurred to the forest ownership patterns after the change from
the socialist system, thus fewer rules were introduced envisaging PFOs.
Czech Republic and Slovakia included, in their revisions of the Forest
Code, specific regulations for the newly established private forests.
The third group of countries, characterised by at least two new
Forest Acts in the period analysed, is represented mostly by the former
socialist countries, thus illustrating the process of institutional adapta-
tion in these countries, needed to assure the transition to a market
economy. In general, the former socialist countries adopted one new
forest act at the beginning of the transition period and the second after
a number of years (e.g. Serbia in 1991 and 2010, Croatia in 1990 and
2005, Lithuania in 1994 and 2003, Romania in 1996 and 2008,
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Hungary in 1996 and 2013, Bulgaria in 1997 and 2011, North
Macedonia in 1997 and 2009). In these countries, the laws issued in the
beginning of the transition period are the reference point for the ana-
lysis of the “mid-1990s” legislation. Estonia records the highest number
of changes to its forest laws, with three versions of the Forest law being
issued in 1993, 1998 and 2006. In the Estonian case, the analysis for the
“mid-1990s” period refers to the legislation applicable in 1993–1998,
while the “current legislation” is the outcome of changes to the forest
law from 2006. The legal changes in former socialist countries resulted
in changes for all of the five property rights categories. The patterns of
changes are not homogeneous (as detailed in Section 4). Denmark with
two new Forest Acts (in 1996 and 2004) was the only western country
in this group. However, for forests outside nature protection areas, legal
changes recorded in Denmark did not result in a major impact on the
ability of a PFO to exercise their private property rights.
3.2. Changes to hunting legislation
Changes to the hunting laws were in general less frequent when
compared to forest-focused legislation i.e. in 18 out of 28 countries
included in the analysis hunting laws were enforced from 1990 to 2015
(Fig. 1). Similar differences were observed between western and former
socialist countries as in the case of legislation that focuses on forests.
Most of the western countries had only amendments to the existing
hunting laws. For example, there was no change to hunting legislation
affecting landowner's decisions in Catalonia since 1970. On the con-
trary, in Austria, patterns of changes to the hunting legislation are di-
verse at the regional level, some regions having issued new hunting
laws while others only made amendments to existing laws. In France, a
very important amendment occurred in 1999 and was confirmed by the
European Court of Human Rights. According to this amendment, a PFO
can prohibit access to hunters for ethical reasons. A decision of the same
court lead to a similar amendment to German Hunting Law. In the
Netherlands, the Hunting Law (originally from 1954), became part of
the Flora and Fauna Act in 2002 (i.e. no specific hunting law since
2002); yet, the hunting rights remained with the forest owners, but
stricter rules were observed. In Portugal, the 1999 Law regulated
hunting practices but had no impact on PFOs rights.
All the former socialist countries, except Romania and Estonia, have
issued one new hunting law in the period analysed. Romania passed
two hunting laws, one in 1996 and one in 2006. Estonia passed three
new hunting laws (1994, 2002, 2013) and numerous amendments to
regulate hunting activities.
3.3. Land reform laws
Land reform laws constitute major legal changes especially in the
context of former socialist countries. These laws are highly relevant to
our analysis because they significantly impacted the ownership pat-
terns.
Former socialist countries had different approaches to forest land
restitution (i.e. giving nationalised forest lands to owners) (Table A3
–appendix A). In Poland, the land reform took place in 1994, but the
forest land was not returned to the previous forest owners. Many of the
former socialist countries dealt with forest land restitution by means of
a single land reform act, usually enforced shortly after the collapse of
the socialist regime (in 1991 in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania,
Estonia, Slovenia) even though many amendments were added over
Fig. 2. Changes in property rights assessed according to the legislation applicable in 2015 compared with mid-1990s (“blue arrows pointing upward” indicate that
the change to the indicator was in the direction of increased freedom for decision making for the PFO in 2015 compared with mid-1990s, while “red arrows pointing
downward“means that the change in the indicator was more restrictive for PFO in 2015 compared with mid-1990s) (Source: compiled by authors based on empirical
data). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
L. Nichiforel, et al. Forest Policy and Economics 115 (2020) 102146
6
time. In Croatia, the Law on restitution and compensation of property
nationalised by the socialist state was passed in 1996 and this law also
allowed PFOs to claim ownership. Until the year 2002, the law was
restricted only to Croatian citizens (preventing others from making
claims). Slovakia promptly issued two new laws, one in 1991 and one in
1993. In Serbia, the restitution process officially started in 2006 with
the Law on the restitution of property to churches and religious com-
munities and this was followed in 2011 with a law regulating property
restitution to physical persons. In Romania, land reform took place
gradually and was implemented by three different land reform laws
that returned a maximum of 1 ha back to PFOs (in 1991), 10 ha (in
2000) and then (in 2005) the entire area owned prior to nationalisation.
Land law reforms in western countries, with an influence on PFOs
property rights, are rare. In the Netherlands, amendments to the Estates
Act (1928) in 2002 brought changes to the ownership requirement: the
estate has to remain in the possession of the owner for at least 25 years,
otherwise the owner must pay taxes. In Scotland, the 2003 land reform
law clarified that access for pedestrian recreation in private forests
could not be restricted. On the other hand, in Greece, many changes
occurred, resulting in a clarification of property ownership and forest
cadastre. The forest cadastre legislation tries to clarify the situation
relating to forests which have either been long considered non-forest
and had to be definitively declassified as forests or have been managed
as forests and had to be designated as forests. For example, since 2012
in Greece it is considered for public interest reasons, that the forestry
areas cleared before the year 2007 for farming purposes without the
competent forestry authority's permission, can remain in use for agri-
cultural or horticultural cultivation and exploitation.
4. Property rights changes
4.1. Changes to the content of property rights
The property rights distribution in regular commercial forests was
influenced to different degrees by the legislative changes occurring in
the last two decades. Of the 37 indicators analysed in 28 countries, we
identified 124 situations were changes occurred (Fig. 2), which re-
presented 12% of the overall combination of countries and indicators
analysed.
The changes represented a liberalisation of PFO's rights in 91 cases
(73%), while in 33 cases (27%) the changes meant more restrictions to
the PFOs' rights. Most of the changes to indicators occurred in the
former socialist countries (95 changes, representing 76% of the total
changes). With regard to the property rights categories, most of the
changes occurred to those indicators characterising management rights
with 61 changes identified for the 13 indicators, meaning an average of
4.7 changes per indicator. The next category is exclusion rights with 27
changes for seven indicators (average 3.9), access rights with three
changes per indicator (average 3), and withdrawal rights with 23
changes for 11 indicators (average 2.1). The category least influenced
by legislative changes is alienation rights with only 10 changes re-
corded for five indicators (average 2).
Changes to access rights were assessed by one indicator (i1), which
identified whether the forest owners' access to their own forest lands
was restricted to some extent. Temporary restrictions were introduced
in the legislation concerning access in areas contaminated by mines
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia) or affected by forest fires (North
Macedonia). Thus, in these three countries the level of restriction in-
creased in the 2015 legislation compared with the mid-1990s.
Changes to withdrawal rights for timber were identified in 11
countries consisting of 17 changes for the six indicators used. In five
countries the freedom for decision making regarding the amount of
timber to be harvested (i2) increased. In Estonia, Lithuania, Czech
Republic and Romania, the 1990s legislation required that all private
forests had to be covered by FMP, which specified the amount of timber
to be harvested. Currently, in Estonia and Lithuania, the amount of
timber to be harvested is decided based on inventory data while in
Romania and Czech Republic, small scale owners can harvest a certain
volume of timber without a FMP. In Finland, the 2014 Forest Act re-
vision discontinued the minimum requirements for mean diameter and
age in final felling thus bestowing more freedom upon owners to decide
the amount of timber to be harvested. On the contrary, the withdrawal
rights for timber became slightly restricted in two countries. In the
Netherlands, since 2002, it is not allowed to do any regular forest
management activities (including harvesting) in the bird breeding
season in deciduous and mixed forests. In Bavaria, since 2005, har-
vesting rights limitations may come from the enactment into the forest
law of the recommendation that clear cuts should be avoided.
With respect to the approval for timber harvests (i3), there were
changes in three countries in which the right to harvest had become less
regulated. In Hungary, any type of harvest was previously based on a
licence from the authorities, while now if the harvest is assigned in the
FMP, the forest manager needs only inform the authority, who has
30 days to issue restrictions. In Estonia and Lithuania, during the 1990s,
permission was required for all cuttings. According to 2015 legislation,
exceptions applied for up to 20 solid m3 of wood per estate per year in
Estonia and for different types of cuttings in Lithuania (e.g. cuttings of
young stands, selective sanitary cuttings or in cases of natural disasters
of forests and harvesting solid timber up to 3 m3/ha per year for per-
sonal consumption). The authority issuing the permit changed in many
former socialist countries (e.g. Croatia, North Macedonia and Romania)
reflected in the fact that before, the state forest company issued per-
mits, whereas in accordance with the 2015 legislation an advisory
service can issue the permits. For some countries, this was reflected in a
decreased level of bureaucracy required to issue harvesting permits
(i7), changes to this indicator being recorded for Estonia, Lithuania,
Hungary and Serbia, while for Bosnia and Herzegovina the level of
bureaucracy increased.
Changes to withdrawal rights for non-wood forest products
(NWFPs) are assessed using five indicators, but changes to these in-
dicators were identified in only five countries. Regarding the PFO's
right to pick up mushrooms from their forests (i8), changes are re-
corded in two countries. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the owners are cur-
rently allowed to harvest up to 1 kg of mushrooms per day, while
previously this was only allowed if specified in the forest management
plans. In Slovenia, the 1998 decree on the protection of wild fungi
states that a maximum limit of 2 kg per person per day of mushrooms
can be collected, without differentiating whether the picker is the
owner or a visitor. In Portugal, there were no regulations for the col-
lection of mushrooms until 2009 when the law limited the collection of
mushrooms for personal consumption to 5 kg per day per person.
Nevertheless, the section covering mushroom picking was repealed in
2012 and consequently the current legal situation returned to the one
existing before 2009. The 2003 Spanish Forest Act clarified that the
owner of wild/spontaneous forest fruits is the landowner; yet, this has
had a very limited impact in Catalonia, given that there are no specific
regional regulations on the matter.
There are no recorded changes in the hunting rights in the period
analysed with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia. In Slovenia, the
ownership of game (i10) has legally changed, the hunting regulation
from 2004 stating that the game belongs to the state and not to the
hunting associations as was previously the legal case. Since the new
Estonian hunting act of 2013, owners have more freedom to decide on
the hunting quota (i11), but only for the small game. With respect to the
right to use forests for grazing (i12), the 2015 version of the Danish
forest act brought a slight limitation to this right as it currently speci-
fically states that a maximum of 10% of the area of a forest property can
be grazed. On the contrary, the changes to the Romanian forest code
from 2008 set conditions to permit grazing take place in private forests,
while previously this was totally forbidden.
Changes to management rights regarding the forest land use are
recorded in 11 countries. In three of these countries, the right of the
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PFO to change the forest land use (i13) has been liberalised, in the sense
that previously a land use change was possible only if deemed to be in
the public interest, while in the 2015 legislation, the change is possible
also if it is solely in the interest of the owners, subject to authority
approval (Austria) or for limited areas and subject to compensation
(Lithuania and Romania). The obligation to assure the reforestation of
forest lands after final cutting (i14) was less arduous on PFOs in three
countries as the state supported fully or partially the cost of reforesta-
tion (Estonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia). In Hungary, the situation
was the opposite: previously there was a forest fund where forest
managers paid and received support on behalf of the owner at the time
of reforestation, while currently there is no payment and no support for
reforestation. In seven countries, the indicator referring to the need to
assure forest regeneration after natural catastrophes has changed (i15).
In three countries, the owners have currently more financial means
available to support the reforestation, either from national funds
(Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) or European Union (EU) subsidies
(Lithuania). The implementation of windthrow insurance in Denmark
and France lead to divergent assessments on the impact to the changes
to PFO's rights. In Denmark, the national windthrow scheme im-
plemented in 2000 created the possibility for the PFO to access public
reforestation support conditional on having signed the insurance prior
to the event. This insurance was also introduced in France in 2015, but
this is assessed as a reduction in PFOs rights since during the 1990s, a
PFO had access to public reconstitution grants after a catastrophic
windthrow without the need for windthrow insurance. Similar slight
reduction in PFOs rights for this indicator are noticed in Ireland and
Slovenia, where previously, reforestation was systematically supported
through a special state fund while currently this can be supported by
way of an application for EU and national funds (Slovenia) or by why of
national forest reconstitution grants (Ireland).
Changes to rights regarding forest management planning occurred
in 15 countries and generally represent an increase in the freedom of
decision making for the PFO (in 22 out of 28 cases). In seven out of the
13 former socialist countries the need to have a FMP (i16), which ap-
plied to all types of forests during the 1990s, was changed to take ac-
count of the forest size. Thus, the obligation to have an FMP only exists
for forests above 10 ha (Poland and Romania), or above 50 ha (Czech
Republic). In Estonia only forest inventory data are needed and only for
forests above 2 ha. In Lithuania, FMPs were previously obligatory for
PFOs if they intended to do a final felling, while today it is the same, but
FMPs are not required for private holdings of less than 3 ha and for final
felling of grey alder, aspen and other low value stands. In North
Macedonia, since 2013 changes were made with respect to the size of
forest areas which must include various types of planning documents;
previously FMPs were required for forests larger than 100 ha and
simplified FMPs for areas less than 100 ha. Nowadays, PFOs with more
than 30 ha need an FMP, owners with 10 to 30 ha need a simplified
FMP and owners with less than 10 ha have to adhere to simplified rules
for forest management. On the contrary, in Bulgaria, there was a re-
verse trend following liberalisation. From 1997 to 2011 in forests below
2 ha, there was no need for an FMP. Currently, all Bulgarian forests
must have an FMP. For properties less than 2 ha the FMP is formulated
in conjunction with the neighbouring state enterprise FMPs and it is
paid for by the state. In three western countries restrictions were added
with respect to the need of FMPs. In France, before 2010, an FMP was
compulsory for every forest owner who owned at least 25 ha in one land
parcel. Since 2010, FMP has been compulsory if the PFO owns 25 ha in
total (taking into accounts all the parcels she owns larger than 4 ha). In
Wallonia, since 2008 the public authority has the right to oppose any
type of excessive harvesting if it is deemed that such harvesting is
contrary to the public interest, as defined in the law. While before 2008,
the forest law had limits in terms of the size of clear cuts and no FMP or
similar was required, today an FMP is required for spatially contiguous
clear cuts larger than 3 ha in deciduous stands and 5 ha in conifer
stands. In Portugal, with the approval in 2005 of the Zone of Forest
Intervention legislation, all PFOs covered by the approved and estab-
lished zones have to jointly prepare a FMP and cooperate in the man-
agement of the forests.
Options to include the PFO's management objectives into the plan-
ning procedure (i18) have increased in five former socialist countries,
where during the 1990s their interests were generally not considered.
In Croatia, Slovakia and Romania the changes are mainly formal as the
owners can express their interest in the course of the planning proce-
dure, without having the capacity to influence the decisions. In the
Czech Republic and Estonia, PFOs can currently choose management
goals within some technical limitations. In the western context, one
important change occurred in Finland, where in 2014 uneven-aged
(continuous cover) forest management formally became a legally viable
option as a forest management regime, meaning owners can choose
repeated selective cuttings and upper-crown harvestings as a forest
management option. Higher restrictions were introduced in the
Bavarian Forest Law of 2005, which specifically states that clear cuts
should be avoided, while previously only vague provisions were given
in the law regarding “sustainable” and “professional” management.
Finally, in many of the former socialist countries, the right to design
an FMP (i19) does not belong anymore to the state, and owners can now
contract authorised experts (Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Serbia and Slovakia).
Changes to rights regarding the implementation of forest operations
were measured by four indicators, which recorded changes in 12
countries. The requirement for the administration of private forests
(i22) has become less restrictive in four countries. In Austria, an
amendment from 2002 requires all forest holdings between 1000 and
3600 ha to hire a forester and above 3600 ha an academic, while
previously the limits were 500 and 1800 ha. In Czech Republic,
Romania and Serbia during the 1990s, the administration of private
forests was imposed by the authorities, but in accordance with the 2015
legislation, PFOs may hire out the administration of the forest to private
entities. In North Macedonia, since 2011 private licencing bodies were
responsible for performing administrative services for PFOs, but
amendments made to the law in 2014 restored the situation to what it
was before 2011, with officials from the state forest enterprise now
being in charge of these administrative services. With respect to the
right to decide which trees are to be harvested (i23), in many of the
former socialist countries, in mid 1990s, the state forest district re-
presentatives selected and measured the trees and calculated the vo-
lume of the forest to be harvested in private forests. In the Czech
Republic, Croatia, Romania and Serbia there is a slight liberalisation of
this requirement, since according to the 2015 legislation the owner can
hire a private licensed forester for this operation. In Estonia and Latvia,
the owners were granted the right to select trees for harvesting from the
mid-1990s. On the contrary, in North Macedonia the PFO has this
service provided only by the public forest enterprise thus no change is
recorded compared to mid-1990s. Regarding the possibility to decide
on the rotation length (i24) changes occurred in two countries. In
Estonia, the owner can currently decide it based on general technical
provisions provided (i.e. minimum imposed age) whereas previously
this was determined by the forest management planner. In Finland, the
Forest Act revision of 2014 removed the average diameter and age
requirements for final felling, and explicitly enabled selective cuttings
and the possibility that a PFO can decide the rotation length with no
constraints, thus there is neither regulation nor supervision regarding
final felling site's maturity as there was previously. Regarding the se-
lection of species to be used for reforestation (i25), six situations arose
as a result of the evolving trends. In Portugal, the 2013 “Law of the
Eucalyptus” simplified the bureaucratic requirements for the estab-
lishment of eucalyptus plantations and gave more freedom to PFOs to
plant this tree species. In Estonia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic,
forest legislation currently provides for a spectrum of species to be used
for afforestation and the owner can decide which species to use, while
previously this was integrated into the management planning
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Fig. 3. Geographical distribution of the Property rights index in forestry (PRIF) in mid-1990s and in 2015 with the identification of the changes in the scope of
decision making from mid-1990s to 2015 (Source: compiled by the authors).
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procedure. Similarly, in Croatia and North Macedonia the owners have
greater freedom in deciding on the species to be used. On the other
hand, in Wallonia (Belgium), the choice of species has become more
restrictive especially with regard to the reforestation of clear cut areas.
Furthermore, in Wallonia the PFO must choose species based on an
ecological guide for any parcels greater than 0.5 ha. In Bavaria
(Germany), an amendment of the national nature protection law in
2002 includes the obligation to use a certain amount of native species in
afforestation.
Changes to exclusion rights for public access were assessed by three
indicators and resulted in the identification of 13 changes in seven
countries. In four countries, the owners have nowadays less rights in
restricting public access into their forests for recreational purposes
(i26). In Scotland, before the Land Reform Act of 2003 the situation was
quite unclear. Traditionally there were no specific regulations re-
stricting public access to forests, but owners often used various means
to prevent public access to the land. Currently, the law stipulates that
the owner cannot restrict pedestrian public access for recreational
purposes. In Ireland, the owner was allowed to restrict access of any
private individual onto their forest property, but since 2008, public
access for recreation must be provided along the forest road for pe-
destrians in private forests where government subsidies have been paid
for forest road construction. In Croatia, Serbia and Romania there were
no regulations during the 1990s for public access into private forests.
According to the 2015 legislation, in Croatia and Serbia the public have
access, but visitors are not allowed to extract material benefits from
private forests or cause damage to the forests. Only in Romania, starting
with 2008, PFOs gained the legal right to exclude the public from
accessing private forests. The right to restrict access on forest roads
when they cross private forests (i27) is currently within the power of a
PFO in Estonia and Romania while previously it was not regulated. For
Ireland the same change was recorded as for the previous indicator i.e.
public pedestrian access must be provided along the grant aided forest
roads. Regarding camping in the forest (i28), rights to camp have been
formalised in Scotland, whereas since 2003 the owner cannot refuse
responsible and short-term camping on unenclosed land; previously
camping was permitted under what was widely perceived as ‘common
law’. In Slovenia since the introduction of the 2006 Protection of Public
Order Act, camping is only allowed in especially designated places. In
Croatia, Serbia and Romania the owner can now legally restrict
camping whereas beforehand camping was legally unregulated.
Changes to exclusion rights for NWFPs occurred in nine countries
for four indicators. The patterns are similar with regard to the PFOs
capacity to exclude the public from collecting mushrooms for recrea-
tional (i29) and for commercial purposes (i30). In Croatia and Romania,
the owners acquired this legal right whereas previously it was un-
regulated. In Lithuania, the previously accepted “everyperson's right”
was modified i.e. the harvesting of mushrooms in private forests closer
than 100 m from the owner's household being permitted only with the
owner's agreement. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the collection of mushrooms
was previously restricted while currently owners must permit the col-
lection of a maximum limit of 1 kg per person per day.
Changes to exclusion rights for hunting on PFO's property (i31) have
occurred in six countries. In France, since 1964, PFOs were obliged to
grant access to hunters if a collective municipal hunting association
existed at a local scale. However, according to the “Chassagnou”
Fig. 4. Calculation of changes in the property rights categories and PRIF between mid-1990s and 2015.
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amendment in 1999, a PFO can restrict hunter's access to their forest for
ethical reasons (ethical opposition to hunting). In Germany, every pri-
vate forest land is part of a hunting district. Since 2013, the hunting
authority has had the power to prohibit hunting if the PFO refuses
hunting on ethical grounds as long as other public interests are not
impeded. In Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia during the 1990s
the owners had to accept hunting activities taking place in their forest
subject to compensation. Nowadays, in Estonia and Lithuania the PFOs
have the legal right to forbid hunting in their forests but if they do they
lose eligibility to apply for compensation if game damages the forest. In
Slovakia and Romania nowadays forest owners can form hunting as-
sociations if they own, individually or in association, more than half of
the area of the hunting ground. In the Czech Republic owners have had
this legal right since 1992 so there is no change in the rights corre-
sponding to this indicator.
Changes to alienation rights referring to restrictions on the sale of
forest lands (i33 and i34) were identified in six countries. The sale of
forest land has become more restrictive in four countries. In France, the
changes to the Forest Code from 2012 introduced a pre-emption right in
favour of the state or the closest neighbours whereas previously the
owner was free to decide whom to sell the forest to. The pre-emption
right was also introduced in Lithuania, Serbia and North Macedonia in
favour of the “neighbours”, whereas beforehand the law did not reg-
ulate this during the 1990s. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic
there was a liberalisation in the law: previously sales of forests were
permitted only to Czech citizens whereas currently there are no re-
strictions on who can purchase forest land, except in national nature
reservations and parks where the state has a pre-emption right. In
Ireland, starting 1990 the Government had the right to execute a
compulsory purchase of forest land, but this power was repealed in
2001, thus owners are free to decide to whom and at what price to sell
their forest land.
Only in Slovenia were changes recorded to the rights of PFOs to
decide to whom they choose to sell their timber to (i35), the form of
sale (i36) and at the sale price (i37). Slovenia is a country that had an
important share of private ownership even in socialist times.
Nevertheless, the state had monopoly over the trade of timber from
private forests. This situation completely changed in 1993, when the
transition to the market economy started and owners got the right to
solely decide on the selling methods for timber.
4.2. Pattern of property rights changes between the mid-1990s and 2015
Looking at the distribution of PRIF according to the legislation ap-
plicable to the mid-1990s, the map shows a clear difference between
the western and the former socialist countries, distinctions which are
less evident nowadays (Fig. 3). In the mid-1990s, the western countries
(with the exception of Greece) had higher PRIFs than any former so-
cialist country. Furthermore, 10 out of the 13 former socialist countries
included in the analysis of the mid-1990's had a highly restrictive legal
framework (PRIF<50) and only Poland, Estonia and Lithuania had a
PRIF slightly above 50 (moderately restrictive legal framework).
Comparing the PRIF values computed for the mid-1990s legislation
with those calculated for the end of 2015 we can derive the following
patterns of changes (Fig. 4):
- there is an overall increase in the PFO's scope for freedom in deci-
sion making, the average PRIF value across the 28 analysed coun-
tries is 59.4 in mid-1990s compared with 62.3 in 2015;
- for the 15 “western” countries included in the analysis the average
PRIF value remained the same (73.0), which confirms the stability
of the property rights distribution in most of these countries;
- for the 13 former socialist countries included in the analysis there
was a significant increase in the average PRIF from 43.7 in mid-
1990s to 50.0 in 2015, which means that the institutional changes in
the former socialist countries had an important impact on the dis-
tribution of property rights; nevertheless, there were greater dif-
ferences among them in the approach of rights liberalisation;
- the 2015 legal framework remains highly restrictive for 10 coun-
tries, but with a modest increase in the average PRIF values com-
pared to the mid-1990s; Czech Republic moved up into the group of
countries with moderate restrictions while Estonia moved up into
the group of countries with a high degree of freedom in decision
making, having the largest absolute increase in PRIF from 53 de-
grees of freedom in 1998 to 76.6 in 2015.
Looking at the changes from the perspective of property rights ca-
tegories (Fig. 4), we see that the average for the 28 countries increased
for management and exclusion rights (both, with an increase of 3.9
degrees of freedom in 2015 compared to the mid-1990s), withdrawal
rights (with an increase of 2.0 degrees of freedom) and alienation rights
Fig. 5. Changes in absolute values of the five property rights categories in relation to PRIF (mid-1990s and 2015). The values present the contribution of each of the
five property rights categories in the PRIF values from 2015 compared to PRIF values from mid-1990s. The countries are presented in the order of the increasing PRIF
values from mid-1990s, from left to right along the horizontal axis (Source: compiled by the authors).
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(1.3) Access rights had a slight decrease of degrees of freedom (−1.1).
Considering the geographical distribution of jurisdictions (Fig. 4),
we observed that overall increases in PRIF were found for the NWE
countries, but these increases were modest, while reductions in PRIF
occurred mainly for CWE countries, but these changes were also small.
Aargau (Switzerland) and Greece are the western jurisdictions that have
maintained a restrictive framework in private forest management re-
cording no changes in the distribution of rights. Among the former
socialist countries, we saw a clear decrease in the average change from
North to South East Europe. NEE countries recorded the highest in-
creased in absolute values of PRIF (14 points). From the CEE region
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia had only small increases in PRIF values.
Former socialist countries with marginal changes to property rights are
mainly from the SEE region, with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia.
At jurisdiction level, we identified differences in the direction of
change in the property rights categories in relation to the values of PRIF
(Fig. 5). Thus, very few changes occurred for the countries that had
high values of PRIF in the 1990s (PRIF>70). For example, in half of
the western countries, with high values of PRIF in the mid-1990s, there
were no changes at all (Norway, Sweden, ES-Catalonia) or only minor
changes (Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark). In the rest of the countries
with high level of PRIF in the 1990s, management rights were slightly
liberalised in Austria and Finland, while on the contrary, some man-
agement restrictions were imposed in Bavaria and Wallonia. In Ireland
the direction of changes to property rights categories was mixed, im-
portant changes occurred to the liberalisation of the right to sell forest
land, while minor restrictions were imposed on the PFO's ability to
prevent public access on grant aided forest roads. In France, besides the
recognition of the right to refuse hunting activities, restrictions came
from the introduction of pre-emption rights and from the additional
requirements for FMPs. In Scotland, only exclusion rights have been
restricted in favour of the public. In general, the property rights in the
Western countries have largely been stable, regardless of their geo-
graphical grouping and are generally characterised by high PRIF values
already in existence from the 1990s.
The diversity of changes in property rights categories (Fig. 5) is
highly visible for the low to mid-PRIF countries (most of the Eastern
Europe groupings) where the patterns of change in property rights ca-
tegories varied significantly. Important changes occurred in most of the
former socialist countries with respect to management rights. The ob-
ligation to have an FMP in all private forests previously required in all
former socialist jurisdictions, is now applicable in only seven out of the
13 formers socialist countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia) while in the others this ob-
ligation depends on the size of the property and/or the forestry works
the owner intends to carry out. The changes in the management rights
are also reflected in the changes to the withdrawal rights for timber
products. Exclusion rights contributed most to the increased PRIF va-
lues in Romania, due to the fact that since 2008 forest owners were
granted full exclusion rights for public access and the harvesting of
NWFPs. Estonia and Lithuania are the only former socialist countries
where PFOs were granted the right to forbid hunting activities on their
property. Alienation rights decreased in the countries that introduced
the pre-emption right for the sale of forest land (North Macedonia,
Serbia, France and Lithuania). In Slovenia, the overall increase in PRIF
is mainly attributable to the termination of the state monopoly in
timber sales from private forests in 1993. The slight reduction in access
rights is explained by the fact that temporal access restrictions imposed
on forest owners were regulated in some Western Balkans countries that
had been involved in military conflicts during the period analysed.
In terms of the relative changes in the PRIF values for 2015 when
compared with the mid-1990s (Fig. 6b), major changes are recorded for
only six countries, all having a former socialist political background
(Croatia, Romania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovenia),
while the rest of countries had limited changes, below 10%.
Croatia has the highest value of relative changes in the overall PRIF
(44%) being the only SEE country in which 11 indicators are liberal-
ised. Nevertheless, the legislative framework remains highly restrictive
namely the retention of the obligation to have a FMP in all private
forests even though the owner can now contract this service to private
entities and can stipulate and influence the management goals (e.g.
species selection). The overall level of PRIF also remains highly re-
stricted in Romania and Slovenia despite a relatively high increase in
PRIF. In Romania the relative increase in PRIF is mainly due to the
changes is exclusion rights. In Slovenia, the changes were mainly re-
lated to alienation rights for timber. The current level of PRIF in
Slovenia, Croatia and Romania remains below the Baltic country's le-
vels of the mid-1990s, despite their high relative increase in PRIF
(Fig. 6a). In the Czech Republic, the changes in the forest code ap-
plicable since 1996 resulted in a liberalisation of the management
rights indicators, while the regulation of the exclusion rights largely
favoured the public. Thus, Czech Republic is currently found in the
Fig. 6. Plot of PRIF values in mid-1990s and 2015 (a) and the relative changes (b). In figure (a) the line is the “no change line”; countries above the line feature a
change towards less regulated property rights. The relative changes between the two time periods are presented in figure (b) (Source: compiled by the authors).
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group of countries with moderate restrictions in PFOs rights. In Li-
thuania, more freedom of decision is granted for withdrawal and
management rights but the implementation of the pre-emption right
reduces the overall increase in the PRIF value. In Estonia, there has
been major trend towards liberalisation with respect to the withdrawal,
management and exclusion rights. This results in the highest absolute
increase in PRIF of all of the countries analysed (17.8) due to Estonia
having the largest number of legal changes documented in the analysed
period.
5. Discussion
Our analysis of changes to property rights identified broad patterns
in the manner in which European countries have adapted forest-focused
legislation to the new policy challenges of the last two decades. The
approach provides new insights and allows us to analyse dynamics and
responsiveness of forest policy systems over the past decades. Hence it
demonstrates the value of the PRIF as a tool for analysing policy
change, in addition to the comparative snap-shot analyses previously
undertaken (Nichiforel et al., 2018). Its value in this regard is two-fold.
First, by analysing the direction of legal changes, it enables us to de-
monstrate geographical patterns in the changing regulatory role of the
state with respect to activities of PFOs. Second, by analysing the content
of the changes in property rights categories we explore the connections
with major challenges influencing forest policies in the last two dec-
ades. Such political trends and motives that may be driving those
changes are e.g. deregulation of forest policy (Arts et al., 2010), en-
vironmental discourse (Leipold et al., 2019) and increased influence of
EU strategies in national forest policies (Pülzl et al., 2013).
Regarding geographical patterns, our analysis shows a marked dis-
tinction in the mid-1990s, between the forest governance approaches
applied in western Europe (which gave more freedom of decision
making to PFOs), and countries from the former socialist bloc (which
had state-centred forest regulatory frameworks). With the exception of
Switzerland and Greece, PFOs in the western countries in our study
already had high degrees of freedom in management and withdrawal
rights, varying mainly in the distribution of exclusion rights. This was
because most western countries had already deregulated forest policy
during the 1980s (Arts et al., 2010), moving from centralised “com-
mand-and-control” approaches to market-based, self-regulatory and
voluntary measures (Glück et al., 2005). For example, many of the
obligations previously imposed on the PFOs in Sweden in accordance
with the Forest Act from 1983 had been withdrawn in 1993 (such as the
obligations to clean young forest, to thin it, to clearfell it and to have a
FMP).
At the beginning of the 1990s, forest policies in the socialist coun-
tries were based on stringent regulatory frameworks, designed to per-
form in the context of predominantly public ownership and centralised
economic systems (Dembner, 1994). These frameworks advocated
strong mandatory technical norms (Lawrence, 2009; Buliga and
Nichiforel, 2019) imposing long rotations, small clear cuts, and annual
allowable cuts significantly below the mean annual increment (Brukas
et al., 2001; Cashore et al., 2006). Current forest governance ap-
proaches in former socialist countries are very diverse. Some countries
still base their forest policy system on strong regulations (most of the
SEE), while others (such as the Baltic countries) have given PFOs
freedom of decision making similar to those in CWE. In between these
extremes, most CEE countries maintain a strong role for the state in
private forest management, although in some cases owners are granted
substantial management (Czech Republic) or exclusion rights (Ro-
mania).
Private forest governance systems in former socialist countries are
particularly related to the approach taken by each country in the forest
land restitution (e.g. Avdibegović et al., 2010; Glück et al., 2011; Nonic
et al., 2011; Brukas et al., 2013; Teder et al., 2015). For example, in the
Baltic countries, radical changes in the share of private ownership (from
0% to more than 40%) were implemented in a single step at the be-
ginning of the 1990s (Table A3-appendix). The number of legislative
changes in this region is the highest among the countries analysed
(Fig. 1), which may explain the changes in values of a significant
number of indicators in the main property rights categories (with-
drawal, management and exclusion). These substantial changes give
forest owners a larger decision space, and reduce administrative costs
while maintaining control mechanisms for management planning and
felling (Teder, 2016). Romania is an interesting contrast to the Baltic
states. It also had a major shift to private ownership, but implemented
over several rounds of legislation, thus the lobby power of PFOs was
directed more towards the forest restitution process that lasted for more
than 20 years and less on adapting the forest management rules in their
interest (Scriban et al., 2019). On the other hand, countries that made
minor changes in the share of private ownership, because they main-
tained some forms of private property during socialist times (e.g. Slo-
venia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Poland), are characterised by fewer
changes in the structure of rights, the state maintaining a central role in
private forest governance (Dobšinská et al., 2020).
The general differentiation between regulatory approaches used in
European private forestry has to be interpreted in the larger context of
policy instruments used to steer implementation of forest policy goals.
One factor differentiating regulatory frameworks is the integration of
neoliberal principles in forest policy and the shift towards market-based
policy instruments (Humphreys, 2009). We have shown that the degree
to which changes occurred in property rights between the two time
periods depends on the degree of restrictions existing in the mid-1990s:
the higher the PRIF value was in the mid-1990s, the more stable
property rights were at the end of the next two decades. Where policy
assumes that individuals are responsible and that markets are func-
tioning well, changes have usually involved the liberalisation and ex-
tension of PFO rights. Where regulation has increased, this is often
intended to integrate environmental concerns into forest legislation,
and simultaneously introduces financial instruments such as compen-
sation or incentives for adopting aligned sustainable management
(Deuffic et al., 2018). The shift towards more individual responsibility
and market based approaches may also result in state withdrawal from
financial responsibility for aspects that can be covered by market in-
struments. Our analysis has pointed to some countries where the state
no longer covers damages to private forests in the case of natural ha-
zards, but still maintains the obligation to replant. In this case, PFOs
have to rely on private market insurance mechanisms, in order to cover
the cost of replanting.
The shift from ‘Soviet era’ rationales for forest management, and
adaptation to the EU common markets, manifest in a range of rather
diverse policy instruments in former socialist countries. For example,
the Baltic countries, Hungary and Slovakia, have successfully used EU
financial mechanisms from the Rural Development Program to provide
annual payments to compensate private owners for the disadvantages
related to Natura 2000 areas (Sarvašová et al., 2019). In contrast, the
stringent legal framework applied in Romania hinders the capacity of
the government to access EU compensation mechanisms related to
Natura 2000 areas as there is little room to add restrictions additional
to those already imposed through existing legislation (Drăgoi and Toza,
2019). Croatia has developed a private forest governance system dis-
tinct from the rest of the SEE countries. While many indicators have
been slightly liberalised giving more freedom of decision making to
forest owners, the state maintains the obligation for all private forests to
have management plans. The government funds this through a “green
tax” imposed on every company operating in Croatia, which provides
annual grants to support the activities of PFOs who provide ecosystem
services (Krajter Ostoić and Vuletić, 2016).
The deregulation trend has been challenged during the last two
decades by increased pressure on forest policies, especially from the
environmental discourse (Sergent et al., 2018). The distribution of
rights is often debated between two advocacy coalitions: e.g. in
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Germany the forestry coalition tries to defend the property rights of the
PFOs while the nature protection coalition pushes for legal minimum
standards, which reduce owners' freedom of decision (Winkel et al.,
2011). Especially in high-PRIF countries, we observe a pressure for
more environmental issues to be addressed by owners' decisions even
for forests located outside protected areas. For example, at the same
time as the 1993 deregulation of the Swedish forest management leg-
islation, environmental concerns were integrated by giving the possi-
bility for authorities to stop clear-felling in areas of specific biodiversity
concerns, of up to approximately 5–10% of a stand's value without fi-
nancial compensation to the land owner. In the Netherlands, since 2002
felling has been banned during the nesting season. Such restrictions are
common in Natura 2000 sites across many countries, yet we see in the
case of the Netherlands a transfer of this regulation to all type of de-
ciduous and mixed forests irrespective of whether they are inside or
outside of Natura 2000 sites. The deregulation trend can even be re-
versed when proven to bring high environmental risks. For example, in
Portugal the 2013 legislation facilitating eucalyptus plantations was
recently repealed given the scale of the devastation caused by the forest
fires in 2017; a new law has been recently issued, with the objective of
limiting the establishment of eucalyptus plantations.
Despite these examples, it is clear from our data that the environ-
mental discourse in the last two decades has had little influence on the
PRIF in “regular productive forests”. This suggests that environmental
legislation and forest-specific legislation are still disconnected in most
of the European countries (Weiss et al., 2017). Since our analysis did
not focus on forests located in protected areas (e.g. Natura 2000 net-
work), the restrictions imposed in forests with protected status are not
displayed in the current values of PRIF. However, the transposition of
European environmental legislation into forest management practice is
an ongoing process (Pukall, 2019). This trend can be seen in some
countries, where, for example, forest laws have been integrated into
nature conservation laws (e.g., Netherlands). New environmental rules
combine restrictions (e.g. Natura 2000 standards, limitations of clear-
cut areas) and new financial and management opportunities. Manage-
ment measures, including consideration of close-to-nature forestry and
species diversification, may provide some opportunities to explore new
forestry models that were not supported up to now by the traditional
foresters. Comparative studies across European countries (e.g. Feliciano
et al., 2017) suggest the need for more innovative support schemes and
advisory services to encourage forest owners to engage with these new
models.
On the other hand, our research shows that owners' rights can in-
crease as a consequence of increased social awareness. For example, in
France and Germany PFOs now have the right to prevent hunting ac-
tivities for ethical reasons. For NWE, increases in PRIF are related to
increased rights in management and freedom of decision, but these are
often motivated by increased environmental concerns. In Finland, de-
regulation is explicitly aimed at allowing PFOs more freedom in their
forest management decisions, implicitly also increasing their responsi-
bility and empowerment to practice more active and multi-faceted
forestry. In Denmark, the voluntary windthrow schemes directed to-
wards native species are based on the same market principles as the
voluntary grants for enhancing management in Natura 2000 areas
(Jacobsen et al., 2013).
Overall, most of the changes we identified across Europe were re-
corded in the categories of management rights and exclusion rights.
This reflects policy maker's concerns to balance between, on the one
hand, an individual's responsibility and the imposition of easily
achievable forest management requirements, and, on the other hand,
forest owners' collective duties and their relations with other users (e.g.
hunters, mushroom pickers, recreationist). These concerns are also the
result of the increased influence of EU strategies on national forest
policies (Pülzl et al., 2013).
Management rights have a central role in most of the European
strategies. For example, the EU Biodiversity strategy (EC, 2011) address
the forestry measures by encouraging the adoption of FMPs, and the
Natura 2000 network also places a high emphasis on management plans
(Weiss et al., 2017). While in many former socialist countries the ela-
boration of a FMP remains an obligation for PFOs, other countries use
financial instruments to stimulate PFOs to draw up FMPs. For example,
support to small forest holders to formulate FMPs has been pro-
grammed in six member states (Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy
and UK) within the framework of the 2014–2020 EU RDP (Alliance
Environment, 2017). At the same time, the “bio-economy” and “bioe-
nergy” turn advocated by forest policy makers over the last decade
(Kleinschmit et al., 2014; Pülzl et al., 2014) has put pressure on man-
agement rights, in order to increase wood mobilization from sustainable
sources (Orazio et al., 2017). For example, in 2010 French forest policy-
makers decided to slightly adjust the requirements for FMPs through an
amendment to the Forest Code, and as a result the number of PFOs
obliged to contract an FMP has doubled (CNPF, 2015). In other coun-
tries, this issue is addressed by soft policy instruments such as subsidies
and advisory services targeting “new”, “absentee” or “passive” forest
owners in the direction of wood mobilization (Weiss et al., 2019a),
often through multi-faceted support programmes (Lawrence, 2018).
The exclusion rights are often disputed between the forest users,
who want free access for recreational activities or for the collection of
NWFPs, and the PFOs who may gain entrepreneurial benefits from
using the exclusion rights (Nichiforel and Schanz, 2011). For example,
in Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia, as a result of increased ex-
clusion rights attributed to PFOs, the transfer of hunting rights from
PFOs to hunting associations has become a growing market. Similar
developments may be seen also from the introduction of picking fees
and mushroom picking norms favouring PFOs (Górriz-Mifsud et al.,
2017). As our analysis has shown, PFOs have received increased legal
support to exclude commercial use of mushrooms without their con-
sent. However, the collection of NWFPs is often embedded in the cul-
ture of household economy and exclusion rights for NWFPs are difficult
to enforce in practice. Thus, the selling and leasing of rights to collect
NWPFs are, with few exceptions, seldom practiced in European private
forests (Wolfslehner et al., 2019).
This redefinition of rights, in particular forest management and
exclusion rights, confirms the proliferation in European forest govern-
ance of an approach based on soft laws where policy makers steer forest
policies through a new set of policy instruments (Kleinschmit et al.,
2014; Sergent et al., 2018). Current efforts in research and policy de-
velopment have a major focus on financial instruments for environ-
mental regulation in forestry as well as agriculture, thus still respecting
a substantial degree of individual PFO discretion. Despite this common
deregulation trend, the structure of property rights remains diverse
between countries, and our research shows that there is still a long way
to go for the European countries to align their forest management
regulations towards the vision of a common European forest policy.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis has illustrated how different forest governance ap-
proaches exist and develop in different ways at the European level,
emphasising the role of the state in the distribution of de jure access,
withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights between
forest owners, forest authorities, and other users.
At the beginning of the 1990s there was a clear distinction in
property-rights distribution between the western countries (with a
higher freedom of decision making attributed to PFOs) and the former
socialist countries entering the transition period. We conclude that
there is no longer a clear line between the western countries and former
socialist countries with respect to PRIF scores. In the western countries,
many of the changes to forest-related laws and their amendments in the
last two decades were made at similar level of rights, which means few
additional rules or norms were introduced, but legislative acts were
tidied up and updated. In contrast, in most of the former socialist
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countries, both the number of legal changes and the impact in property
rights changes was higher. In countries with high PRIF scores in mid-
1990s we sometimes find these declining (mainly in CWE), driven by
environmental and forest user concerns; in other cases, environmental
concerns are pursued using deregulation or market based instruments,
which rely on decision-making of PFOs (e.g. Finland and Denmark). In
these latter cases we see PRIF scores continuing at a high level. Across
the former socialist countries, we see deregulation in some areas, at
various speeds. Nevertheless, most of the former socialist countries,
with the exception of Baltic states, still maintain a high level of state
coercion on private forest management.
Although we cannot extrapolate our conclusions outside the ana-
lysed period, we can still note implications for possible future legal
changes. The general deregulation trend begs the question: how far is it
possible to liberalise the freedoms of PFOs to make decisions, without
negatively affecting the practice of sustainable forest management? The
future development of property rights is likely to be accompanied by
increasing demands from outside the forestry sector, the endorsement
of policies by a complex constellation of stakeholders and – at least in
some states, by a focus on decentralization (from the state to regional
forest authorities). While it is expected that national forest policy goals
will slowly converge to a more uniform distribution of rights across
Europe under the pressure of biodiversity and climate change policies,
national governance frameworks may pursue shared goals with diverse
policy instruments. Such a convergence may mean more management
restrictions in the high-level PRIF countries and new policy instruments
and more freedom of decision in the field of forest management in the
low-level PRIF countries. Potential forest policy instruments may not
necessarily focus on the reconfiguration of property rights, particularly
not on the material dimension of rights, but rather on the redefinition of
fiscal advantages and the financial instruments used to balance the
cost/benefits of PFOs, to alleviate unintended economic losses or to
promote responsible forest management practices.
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